INTRODUCTION
The original argument for unfunded systems is based on the possibility of dynamic inefficiency, or capital overaccumulation (Diamond (1965) , Samuelson (1975) ): individuals may save too much, and the rate of return on capital be too low relative to the growth rate of the economy. Unfunded pensions are a direct method of redistributing consumption across generations, and restoring efficiency. Excessive saving may be a particular problem in situations where younger workers cannot fully insure future risks of income or mortality (Diamond (1977) ).
The current case funding is made, among other things, on the grounds that the rate of return on investment exceeds income growth (e.g. Aaron (1966) , Feldstein(1974) , (1996) ) and therefore in the absence of labour supply effects and changes in the tax regime, investment in funded systems yields higher returns. The force of the "rate of return" argument is particularly strong in nations with negative population growth, and an ageing population. The cost of unfunded pensions falls asymmetrically on younger workers. Miles (1997) evaluates the practical relevance of these arguments, as well as the likely impact of transition to a funded system in the UK and comparable countries.
However, this analysis focused on the mean level of returns and ignored the variance and portfolio effects. Such effects were indeed looked at by Merton (1983) , and Merton et.al. (1987) as well as by Dutta, Kapur and Orszag (1999) . Earnings risks cannot be diversified directly, and partial funding allows the old to hold shares in the human capital of the young.
This paper provides a simplified treatment for some of these arguments, casting the optimal pension funding choice in a mean-variance portfolio choice framework. The optimum funding solution then is to hedge by holding a diversified set of liabilities, both funded and unfunded. Section 2 below looks at this problem. Section 3 extends the basic mean-variance model to look at what portfolio share of bonds and equities should be held in a funded system. In particular, the portfolio weights in equities and bonds depend on the level of funding. A final section concludes.
Date: May 1999.
A SIMPLE MEAN-VARIANCE MODEL
The rate of return to a funded pension is Ö whereas an unfunded pension has return where is the growth rate in national income. We suppose a fraction Û of pension liabilities are covered with funded provision and the remainder is unfunded. Then, the total pension workers will receive per unit of money contributed is: ½ · ÛÖ· ½ Ûµ . Since both Ö and are random variables, the utility of mean pension income is:
where È is the pension workers receive. To obtain the optimal funded/unfunded mix, we maximize with respect to the funded share Û, obtaining:
In the absence of risk aversion, we obtain the (Aaron,1966 ) solution that it is optimal to invest in a funded system when Ö . However, with risk aversion or some degree of uncertainty over Ö and , it is better to hedge by using a mixture of funded and unfunded pensions. To keep the analysis simple, we focus on a quadratic mean-variance utility function:
In this case:
so that expected utility depends on the mean È and variance ¾ È of the pension. The variance of the pension is:
The optimal funded share is: variance becomes more significant. For example, when ½ ¼ , the optimal level of funding falls to ½½±. Positive corelation between Ö and does affect the optimal level of funding as unfunded systems provide less risk hedging the more positively correlated are Ö and ; optimal funding levels for correlations of ¼ ¿ between Ö and as varies are shown in Fig. (1) .
The numbers we have chosen for the means, variances, and covariances are actual historical figures for British equities and GNP growth from 1961-1996. How much weight gets put on the variance determines what fraction is funded and what is unfunded; since typically returns on funded pensions have higher variances, simple rate of return calculations bias policy conclusions towards too much funding. Unfunded pensions have less volatile returns and hence are preferable the higher the level of risk aversion. This analysis suggests that even if Ö is substantially higher than , it is worthwhile for some pension liabilities to be unfunded for hedging purposes. Fig. (2) shows a mean-variance frontier and identifies the optimal mixed system at the tangency between the displayed indifference curveand the mean-variance frontier.
PORTFOLIO ALLOCATION IN FUNDED SYSTEMS
Another consideration is that unfunded social security will affect optimal portfolio allocations of investors. As an example of this, consider a country such as Singapore or Malaysia which has a largely funded system. In such a country, there is not an unfunded system to provide a risk hedge and therefore the funded schemes invest in less risky, lower return assets. While there may be other factors such as political independence of the investment board which are important, the level of risk in alternative available assets is also a crucial consideration. In the absence of another low risk alternative, individuals and pension funds will hold government bonds which may have more volatile returns than that on unfunded pensions. A common argument for funded pensions is that they will lead to more developed capital markets. One issue with these arguments is that the existence of unfunded pensions is an important risk hedge through which diversification into equities can take place.
To illustrate this point, we extend Fig. (2) and replace the point on this chart corresponding to the "Funded" system with "Equity" as we previously assumed the funded system invested entirely in equity. In Fig. (3) , we add a bond which has slightly higher return but more risk than the unfunded system. The proportion of the portfolio allocated to equity may well fall as shown in Fig. (3) È ½ · Û Ö· Û´½ µÖ · ½ Ûµ (8) where is the fraction of the funded pension allocated to equity. Given fixed Û, the asset allocation problem is to choose optimally. The first order condition is:
Û ´Í ¼´È µ´Ö Ö µµ ¼
A change in Û will all else equal raise the value of È provided high enough returns and will hence drive down the value of the marginal product Í ¼´È µ, leading a switch into bonds and out of equity.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has provided a simplified model of why funded pensions should ordinarily be combined with unfunded pensions in order to maximize the combination of risk and return. It also has provided a simple analytical framework for assessing what fraction of investments in a funded system should be funded and unfunded. This simplification comes at a cost. There is no general equilibrium wage or rate of return determination or careful modelling of issues such as early retirement and the government budget constraint. Despite the simplicity though, the message of paying more attention to risk-return tradeoffs in social security policy analysis is well-worth heeding.
